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Regulation, Renegotiation, and Reform: Improving 
Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in the Wake of 
the Gulf Oil Spill† 
JOHN J. MCKINLAY* 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 2010, British Petroleum managers aboard the Deepwater Horizon 
congratulated the rig’s workers for their stellar safety record: they had operated 
seven years without a single workplace injury.1 A few hours after that evening’s 
celebration, a high-pressure bubble of methane gas rose three miles through the 
Deepwater Horizon’s drill column, destroying a previously damaged blowout 
preventer on its way upward.2 When the bubble reached the surface of the rig and 
ignited, the “blowout”3 caused a massive explosion that killed eleven rig workers, 
injured sixteen others,4 and unleashed the largest oil spill in American history.5 
Regarding the physical mechanics of the blowout, the U.S. government and British 
Petroleum (BP) recognize that preexisting safety measures could have prevented 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster.6 Regarding the legal mechanics of regulation 
before and liability after the Gulf Oil Spill (“the Spill”), however, lawmakers are 
too willing to embrace the regulatory status quo. 
In the wake of the disaster, BP; its partners Halliburton,7 Mitsui,8 Transocean,9 
Anadarko;10 and the U.S. government scrambled to simultaneously contain the 
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 1. Blowout: The Deepwater Horizon Disaster, CBSNEWS (Sept. 21, 2010, 1:16 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/16/60minutes/main6490197.shtml. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Carl Hoffman, Investigative Report: How the BP Oil Rig Blowout Happened, 
POPULARMECHANICS.COM (Sept. 2, 2010, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/how-the-bp-oil-rig-blowout-
happened. 
 5. Matthew Scott, BP’s Gulf Oil Spill Worst in U.S. History, DAILY FIN. (May 27, 
2010, 12:15 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/05/27/bps-gulf-oil-spill-worst-in-u-s-
history/.  
 6. See Henry Fountain & Tom Zeller, Jr., Panel Suggests Signs of Trouble Before Rig 
Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2010, at A1. 
 7. Peter J. Henning, Looking for Liability in BP’s Gulf Oil Spill, NYTIMES.COM (June 
7, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/looking-for-liability-in-bps-
gulf-oil-spill/. 
 8. See Tom Bergin, BP Cuts Oil Spill Burden with £677 Million Mitsui Deal, 
REUTERS.COM (May 20, 2011, 10:40 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/20/uk-bp-
mitsui-idUKTRE74J11I20110520. 
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disaster and either reduce or avoid environmental and economic liability for it.11 BP 
waged a public relations campaign,12 likely aimed at keeping its stock price up13 
and perception of the Spill’s severity down.14 Undoubtedly, BP’s managers 
calculated the company’s potential criminal liability—based on the volume of oil 
spilled—under measures such as the Clean Water Act15 and Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act.16 The Obama Administration (“Administration”), which had recently 
exempted BP from key oversight and preparedness requirements,17 reprised its 
oversight role with a vengeance. President Obama declared a moratorium on 
deepwater drilling in coastal waters surrounding the United States.18 The 
government later lifted the moratorium after adopting “new regulatory measures.”19 
Oil extractors and environmental groups alternatively praised and decried the 
Administration’s reversal.20 The Administration also quickly disbanded the 
Minerals Management Service (MMS)21 and rechristened it the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE).22 The commission 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See Hoffman, supra note 4. 
 10. See Chris Kahn, BP Partners Refuse to Help Pay for Gulf Oil Spill, HUFFINGTON 
POST (July 13, 2010, 4:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/13/bp-partners-
moex-anadarko_n_645117.html.  
 11. See, e.g., John Schwartz, BP Bills Its Partners for a Share of the Oil Spill Cost, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 5, 2010, at A10 (discussing BP’s attempts to spread liability costs among its 
partners and its insurer in the face of the U.S. government billing BP for costs associated 
with the Gulf Oil Spill).  
 12. See Cain Burdeau, BP Ad Campaign Following Gulf Oil Spill Deemed 
‘Propaganda’ by Some, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2012, 11:38 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/08/bp-ad-campaign-gulf-oil-_n_1192600.html.  
 13. See Oil Spill Hits BP’s Stock, Threatens Its Future, LAWYERS.COM, 
http://securities.lawyers.com/Securities/Oil-Spill-Hits-BPs-Stock-Threatens-Its-Future.html.  
 14. See Helen Pidd, BP Oil Spill Estimates Double: US Government Figures Show 
Twice as Much Oil Spewing into the Gulf of Mexico Than Earlier Estimations Suggested, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2010, 10:07 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/2010/jun/11/bp-oil-spill-estimates-double. 
 15. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2006).  
 16. 16 U.S.C. § 707. 
 17. See Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Exempted BP’s Gulf of Mexico Drilling from Environmental 
Impact Study, WASH. POST (May 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/04/AR2010050404118.html?hpid=topnews. BP received a 
“categorical exclusion” from the National Environmental Policy Act’s requirement for 
environmental impact studies due to the perceived unlikelihood of a large spill in the region. 
See id.  
 18. Bryan Walsh, Obama Issues New Offshore Drilling Moratorium, TIME.COM (July 
12, 2010, 8:27 PM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/07/12/obama-issues-new-
offshore-drilling-moratorium/. 
 19. Peter Baker & John M. Broder, U.S. Lifts the Ban on Deep Drilling, with New Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2010, at A1. 
 20. See id. (discussing views of proponents and opponents of the moratorium).  
 21. See Perry Bacon Jr., David A. Fahrenthold & Steven Mufson, Lawmakers Assail 
Minerals Management Service, WASH. POST (May 26, 2010, 4:16 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052602787. 
html. 
 22. Neil King, Jr., Salazar Renames MMS, Adding ‘Regulation and Enforcement’, 
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tasked with investigating the Spill found that MMS’s and BP’s “shared failure” 
caused the Spill.23  
The centerpiece of Congress’s reaction was the Big Oil Bailout Prevention 
Liability Act of 2010 (“the 2010 Act”).24 In light of the “laughably low liability 
level”25 in place under the controlling Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990 (OPA),26 
Senator Robert Menéndez introduced the 2010 Act27 to retroactively increase BP’s 
liability cap to $10 billion. Though the original Act was defeated in the Senate in 
September 2010,28 Representative Rush Holt reintroduced the proposed legislation 
as the Big Oil Bailout Prevention Liability Act of 2011 (“the 2011 Act,” or 
alternatively, “the Act”) in the House in January 2011,29 with Senator Menéndez 
following suit in the Senate.30 The 2011 Act seeks to remove liability limits 
altogether.31 Though the 2011 Act has been stalled in committee since the 
Republican-controlled Congress was seated in January 2011,32 the very 
introduction of the Act indicates a systemic misalignment of incentives and raises 
important questions regarding the proper scope and mechanics of public-private 
partnership (P3) regulation.  
The Act’s proposed retroactive liability provision raises questions about 
prospective measures that could better implement public welfare and infrastructure 
development aims. This Note proposes that the present regulatory systems 
governing transnational P3s, as brought to light by the BP disaster, are costly, 
ineffective, and outdated. Furthermore, this Note argues that renegotiation as a 
corrective measure should be discontinued inasmuch as it may impose significant 
indirect costs on taxpayers—the true public side of a P3. The key to implementing 
a system that is efficient and beneficial to both parties of a P3 lies in realigning 
incentives of both parties and streamlining the regulatory process through more 
front-end participation and less back-end regulation. Part I of this Note examines 
                                                                                                                 
WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2010, 5:32 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/06/21/salazar-
renames-mms-adding-regulation-and-enforcement/.  
 23. ‘Shared Failure’ in BP Spill Cited in Panel Report: Reforms Needed Since 
‘Oversight Utterly Failed,’ Says Co-chair of Obama Commission, MSNBC.COM (Jan. 11, 
2011, 11:34 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41020738/ns/us_news-environment.  
 24. Big Oil Bailout Prevention Liability Act of 2010, S. 3305, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 25. Katarzyna Klimasinska & Noah Buhayar, ‘Laughably Low’ Spill Liability Cap 
Spurs U.S. Debate After BP, STUART SMITH BLOG (Feb. 10, 2011) (citing Rep. Rush Holt), 
http://www.stuarthsmith.com/‘laughably-low’-spill-liability-cap-spurs-u-s-debate-after-bp. 
 26. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006) (setting liability limits for offshore facilities such as 
the Deepwater Horizon at removal costs plus $75 million). 
 27. S. 3305 (proposing a retroactive increase of the liability cap for deepwater oil spills 
from $75 million to $10 billion). 
 28. Geoff Holtzman, Oil Spill Commission Suggests Raising Liability Cap, TALK RADIO 
NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 11, 2011, 11:44 AM), http://www.talkradionews.com/quicknews/ 
2011/1/11/oil-spill-commission-suggests-raising-liability-cap.html.  
 29. H.R. 492, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 30. S. 214, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 31. See H.R. 492 (proposing removal of liability cap effectuated at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2704(a)(3)).  
 32. The bill, with twenty-three Democratic co-sponsors and no Republican sponsors, 
was referred to the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on January 26, 
2011. See H.R. 492. No action on the bill has since been taken. See id.  
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the nature of P3s in the United States and that of the MMS/BP arrangement in 
particular. Part II discusses American P3 regulation, its limitations, and potential 
improvements that can be made. Part III addresses detrimental effects of the United 
States’ actions and suggests reforms to benefit both public and private parties in 
future P3 arrangements. Part IV utilizes scholarship from corporate governance, 
transnational legal pluralism, and notions of the government as a fiduciary to 
anticipate objections to reform and suggest means to overcome them. 
I. P3S: RATIONALES, RISKS, AND RENEGOTIATION  
The rationale underlying the formation of P3s is that private companies partner 
with local governments to perform tasks deemed too operationally complex, capital 
intensive, or risky for the government to undertake alone.33 Generally speaking, 
such arrangements enable public partners to limit expenditures and risks while 
receiving royalty payments from the private partner, whereas the private partner is 
able to deploy its expertise and capital in operational enterprises34 that promise 
sufficiently large returns35 to absorb risk the public partner would otherwise incur.36 
In effect, each partner in a P3 arrangement undertakes both public and private law 
functions.37  
Transnational extraction projects exist in part to implement national energy, 
economic, employment, or infrastructure development policies while reducing 
industrial development expenditures.38 Within a transnational P3, implementation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. See JOHN LOXLEY WITH SALIM LOXLEY, PUBLIC SERVICE PRIVATE PROFITS: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN CANADA 176 (2010) (“The 
apparent motivation behind the approach [of creating P3s] has shifted to some degree from 
an attempt to move infrastructure spending and debt off the government books, to a desire to 
reduce costs through transferring risk to the private sector.”); see also MICHAEL B. LIKOSKY, 
LAW, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27–28 (2006) (noting that the Panama Canal 
and trans-American railroad construction projects were P3s).  
 34. See LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 2–3 (“With P3s, the large up-front 
capital costs associate with infrastructure projects can . . . be offset and spread over a number 
of years through a lease . . . . Private firms can assume responsibility for things that may go 
wrong, such as project over-runs, problems resulting from poor construction, etc.”).  
 35. As Loxley notes, “P3s offer important opportunities for profit-making.” Id. at vii.  
 36. See R. PRESTON MCAFEE & JOHN MCMILLAN, INCENTIVES IN GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTING 9 (1988). 
 37. See LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 23 (“Within PPPs, the interests of governments and 
companies are intertwined.”); see also id. at 24 (“[I]n the context of specific PPPs, 
companies might combine public and private law powers.”).  
 38. See id. at 24 (“Commentators have long complained that private companies, for 
example, have taken on too many political powers.”). This is especially true in the case of 
large companies. See id. It would seem even more relevant in discussing transnational 
companies with presumably less incentive to enhance the foreign host country’s public 
welfare. See Nick Beermann, Legal Mechanisms of Public-Private Partnerships: Promoting 
Economic Development or Benefiting Corporate Welfare?, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 175, 204 
(1999) (“Economic development is often advanced as a reason for creating public-private 
partnerships.”); G. Allen Brooks, Musings: Future of the Gulf of Mexico Oil & Gas Industry, 
RIGZONE (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.rigzone.com/news/ article.asp?a_id=101257 
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of public policy is effectively outsourced to a foreign entity. Ensuring that 
transnational partners adequately promote domestic public welfare aims is a 
formidable challenge to P3 regulators. One potential solution—exemplified by the 
Act—is the threat of renegotiation.39 This Note argues that renegotiation should be 
a disfavored mechanism in transnational P3s insofar as it ultimately increases the 
costs of business and sustains a regulatory regime unlikely to avert disasters such as 
the Spill. 
For economic and historical reasons, transnationals like BP are increasingly 
important players in capital-intensive industries like mineral extraction.40 In 
accordance with the American policy of reducing dependence on foreign oil,41 the 
United States tasked BP with accessing its deepwater oil reserves. Typical of such 
oil and gas exploration arrangements, BP’s lease to drill for oil in the Gulf of 
Mexico is a concessionary lease from the U.S. government agency tasked with 
oversight of the arrangement—the MMS/BOEMRE.42 Events surrounding the Spill 
demonstrate two dangers inherent in poorly supervised transnational P3 leases: the 
private entity may find itself in a position to ignore the host country’s public 
welfare aims in light of the company’s profit motive,43 and the public goals of cost 
saving and revenue generation incentivize the overseeing agency to become a 
                                                                                                                 
(explaining, from the oil industry’s perspective, why deepwater drilling is necessary for 
American energy policy).  
 39. In this context, renegotiation is a unilateral action undertaken by the stronger party. 
Prior to the formation of a P3, the government negotiates for favorable conditions based on 
anticipated benefit to the country as a stakeholder. See J.J. Boddewyn, Multinational 
Business-Government Relations: Six Principles for Effectiveness, in MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS: BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 193, 196 (Patrick M. Boarman & Hans Schollhammer eds., 1975). 
Risks are assigned as under any contract, and such losses are insured by the insurance 
carriers. See generally Ronald J. Daniels & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Provision of 
Public Infrastructure: An Organizational Analysis of the Next Privatization Frontier, 46 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 375 (1996). Because of public parties’ sovereign power to rescind a lease 
under its own law, expel the private party from its borders, nationalize, or otherwise take 
advantage of its relative power, the government may act opportunistically or legitimately to 
increase the benefit to the country or allay the damage created by the private partner. See 
MICHAEL LIKOSKY, OBAMA’S BANK: FINANCING A DURABLE NEW DEAL 333 (2010) (noting 
that many renegotiations are driven by the inequitable flow of benefits to private partners 
and risks to the public partners). 
 40. LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at vii (“P3s . . . draw[] on private sector 
technical expertise, private sector organizational and management experience and private 
sector capital to deliver public services.”). 
 41. See Kerri Shannon, United States Lifts Oil Drilling Ban to Reduce Foreign Energy 
Dependence, MONEY MORNING (Apr. 1, 2010), http://moneymorning.com/2010/04/01/ 
drilling-ban/. 
 42. See Dane Hahn, Unraveling BP’s Oil Lease in the Gulf, ENGLEWOOD EDGE (June 8, 
2010, 2:19 AM), http://www.englewoodedge.com/2010/06/08/unraveling-bps-oil-lease-in-
the-gulf/. A concessionary contract is one in which the “government cedes a mix of 
ownership and control over a public activity to a private-sector entity.” See LIKOSKY, supra 
note 39, at 189.  
 43. See Boddewyn, supra note 39, at 196 (noting that successful P3s demand “focusing 
on the integration of the guest company into the host economy and society through the 
obeying of laws”). 
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rubber stamp for the private parties’ wishes.44 The lines between public policy and 
profit motive become uncomfortably blurred in a P3, removing incentives for either 
party to act in the public interest and instead pursue only monetary gain.45 Leading 
up to the Spill, BP avoided meaningful regulation46 to increase its profits and 
reduce cost overruns resulting from delays.47 As the world learned in the wake of 
the Spill, existing administrative regulations leading up to the disaster were ill 
equipped to avoid an otherwise preventable economic and environmental disaster.48 
The existence of the 2011 Act indicates the degree to which contract terms and 
administrative regulations inadequately accounted for risk to the public.49 Such 
shortcomings can only be inferred ex post, however, since the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) generally exempts from public scrutiny sensitive business 
information reified in extraction contracts.50 Beyond the structural opaqueness 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. Hahn, supra note 42 (noting that the United States received $34 million as a 
prepayment on the lease and was to collect 12.8% of revenues generated from producing 
wells drilled by BP in the Macondo tract); see also LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 
175 (“One of the most disturbing aspects of P3s is the uniformly abysmal record of 
accountability and transparency.”); JULIA STEETS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC POLICY 
PARTNERSHIPS 39 (2010) (“Public-private policy partnerships must be accountable if they are 
to fulfill policy objectives successfully.” (quoting Pauline Vaillancourt)); Eilperin, supra 
note 17 (noting the superficial review given BP’s operations before exempting BP from a 
mandatory environmental impact study). 
 45. See LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 24 (“In each case, the concern is that private 
companies are too intermingled with governments and are thus acting as political bodies 
exceeding their private law remit.”); see also generally Klaus Dingwerth & Tine Hanreider, 
Public Markets and Private Democracy? The Renegotiation of Public and Private in Global 
Politics, in DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 81 
(Magdalena Bexell & Ulrika Mörth eds., 2010) (discussing the blurred distinction between 
public and private actors and tasks in P3s).  
 46. See Mark Clayton, BP Oil Spill: MMS Shortcomings Include ‘Dearth of 
Regulations,’ CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 17, 2010), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0617/BP-oil-spill-MMS-shortcomings-
include-dearth-of-regulations. 
 47. See Kevin Spear, Documents Show BP Chose a Less-Expensive, Less-Reliable 
Method for Completing Well in Gulf Oil Spill, ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 23, 2010), 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-05-23/news/os-florida-oil-spill-unspoken-risks-
20100522_1_oil-company-bp-rig-oil-spill. 
 48. See Clayton, supra note 46; see also ‘Shared Failure’ in BP Spill Cited in Panel 
Report, supra note 23.  
 49. See LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 3 (“The desirability and effectiveness 
of any P3, from the point of view of the various actors, is directly related to the specific 
content of the contract, the way it is implemented and the vision behind it.”). This statement 
of course assumes that BP and the MMS were economically rational actors at the time the 
lease originated.  
 50. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION 
THROUGH LAW REFORM 89 (2004). Congressman Issa requested information on behalf of the 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, but was denied access to 
communications between the Interior Department and private sector entities. See Letter from 
Darrell Issa, U.S. Rep. for Cal., to Kenneth Salazar, Sec’y Interior (May 3, 2010), available 
at http://www.boemre.gov/deepwaterreadingroom/; Letter to Darrell Issa, U.S. Rep. for Cal. 
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engendered by broad FOIA protection, parties usually conduct P3 contract 
negotiations without public participation,51 often antithetical to public welfare 
interests,52 and subcontracted to multiple parties outside the host country.53 The 
implications of extraction P3s for the host country’s environment, labor sector, 
taxpayers, and business climate are far reaching, though the process of negotiating 
such arrangements is generally designed to exclude these interests,54 thus 
substituting contracts negotiated behind closed doors for public policy referenda.55 
The host country’s public welfare aims are further jeopardized by the tendency of 
savvy transnational contractors to take advantage of inherent economic and 
jurisdictional limitations by subcontracting riskier aspects of projects to other 
transnationals.56  
Private partners also bear substantial risks in transnational P3s. When extraction 
contracts are inadequate for unforeseen real-world developments, state actors 
engaged in P3s may seek to renegotiate contracts—changing the terms to reassign 
downside risk away from the public partner and its constituents.57 Renegotiation in 
this instance can be thought of as the sword wielded when the shield fails. The Act 
clearly demonstrates the dangers renegotiation poses to the private P3 party. 
Through the 2011 Act,58 the U.S. government seeks unlimited liability in order to 
recover from its P3 partner in excess of the original terms—the $75 million liability 
cap under the OPA which BP’s insurer, Jupiter Insurance, Ltd., ostensibly relied 
upon at the time BP negotiated its lease.59 As an ad hoc remedy in extraction 
industry P3s, renegotiation is recognized as a necessary evil despite its adverse 
                                                                                                                 
from Christopher P. Salotti, Legislative Counsel, Office of Cong. and Legislative Affairs 
(July 21, 2010), available at http://www.boemre.gov/deepwaterreadingroom/.  
 51. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 176 (“P3 planners typically oppose efforts at 
deliberative participatory decision-making.”).  
 52. Id. at 180 (noting that participatory planning by non-parties is seen as a financial 
risk to be mitigated).  
 53. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 197. 
 54. See, e.g., B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre, Public-Private Partnerships and the 
Democratic Deficit: Is Performance-Based Legitimacy the Answer?, in DEMOCRACY AND 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 45, at 41, 46 (“[T]he 
operative efficiency of partnerships hinges to some extent on seclusion from public 
debate.”). 
 55. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 180–81.  
 56. See Kahn, supra note 10 (noting that arbitration is the only legal option for BP to 
collect from its partners).  
 57. See supra note 39.  
 58. Big Oil Bailout Prevention Liability Act of 2011, H.R. 492, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 59. See Michael Cessna, Insurance Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 
LEXISNEXIS.COM (May 17, 2010, 1:43 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/ 
insurancelaw/blogs/insurancelawblog/archive/2010/05/17/insurance-implications-of-the-
deepwater-horizon-disaster-by-michael-cessna-of-counsel-lathrop-amp-gage-llp.aspx (noting 
the liability limits of the insurance underwriter). As Cessna notes, the liability requirements 
in place at the time of negotiation were fixed by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which was 
itself a response to the disastrous Valdez spill in Prince William Sound. See id. The 
government’s punitive damages recovery was limited by the United States Supreme Court 
after MMS’s March 2008 lease with BP was entered into. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 
554 U.S. 471 (2008).  
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effects on business.60 The amount the government seeks to recover from BP will 
likely exceed $50 billion,61 though potential sanctions under the Clean Water Act, 
private securities actions, and negligence suits may well double BP’s costs.62 Other 
estimates put the number as high as $100 billion after cleanup and litigation costs 
are taken into account.63 BP is in turn seeking to recover from its investors,64 
though BP does not have as much negotiation leverage as the U.S. government 
does through its sovereign powers.  
As long as P3s have existed, renegotiation has existed.65 Renegotiation 
essentially imposes new, unfavorable contract terms on the private partner that is 
otherwise powerless to continue its business without accepting the renegotiated 
terms. Large transnationals are especially vulnerable to renegotiation given their 
structural lack of political representation in the host country, the potential for 
adverse public sentiment toward foreign entities,66 and the typically large 
investment and liability exposure associated with the massive infrastructure 
projects in which they are most likely to participate.67 Because the proposed Act 
would apply retroactively, it is a form of unilateral renegotiation of the contract 
terms by the United States.68 While electoral politics compel the host country in a 
transnational P3 to shift the economic burden from their constituent taxpayers to 
the transnational operators after a disaster such as the Spill,69 relying on 
renegotiation as a viable alternative to adequate negotiation at the P3’s formation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. See YINKA OMOROGBE, THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY: EXPLORATION AND 
PRODUCTION CONTRACTS 5 (1997) (acknowledging renegotiation as a function of inevitable 
changes).  
 61. Tom Bergin, How BP’s Gulf Oil Disaster Costs Could Double, INS. J. (Dec. 1, 
2010), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2010/12/01/115279.htm (showing 
that total costs of the BP disaster are being adjusted continuously upward, and are presently 
estimated to be around $50 billion). 
 62. Id.  
 63. See Daniel Bates, ‘The Most Incompetent CEO in Living Memory’: BP Chief Tony 
Hayward Demoted After Public Flogging as Clean-up Cost Could Reach $70bn, MAIL 
ONLINE (June 19, 2010, 9:37 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1287685/BP-
oil-spill-Shares-rise-Louisiana-puts-cost-100billion.html.  
 64. Schwartz, supra note 11.  
 65. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 287–88 (discussing renegotiation as a measure 
typically undertaken by governments); see also id. at 292 (“In fact, efforts to renegotiate 
projects result in revision of material contract terms.”).  
 66. See After Dubai Ports World, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/03/AR2007030301029. 
html.  
 67. See Cessna, supra note 59 (noting some of the larger P3 arrangements undertaken 
and that BP’s insurer is capable of underwriting up to $700 million of liability insurance).  
 68. LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 3 (“[Q]uestions arise about . . . who is 
bearing the costs of these arrangements. It is at that point that P3s potentially become 
controversial, as not everyone involved may be a winner, and then the details of any 
arrangement become crucial.”). 
 69. Id. at 176–77 (“Indeed, without evidence of risk transfer, there is, in general, no case 
for the P3 approach.”).  
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reduces or eliminates the economic benefits of vital P3 arrangements and increases 
the ultimate costs to both sides of P3s.70 
Clearly accidents will happen regardless of how well-negotiated future contracts 
are; however, renegotiation is a symptom of a failed process as well as a predicate 
to indirect future costs. If existing regulatory and negotiation structures in P3 
arrangements are not reformed, increasing direct and indirect costs may jeopardize 
the efficacy of transnational P3s.71 The Act seeks to resolve the question of who 
should pay for the cleanup of the Gulf, but it raises the issue of what mechanisms 
can prospectively eliminate the need for such measures by aligning business and 
public welfare aims with the government’s goal of reducing costs through P3 
arrangements.72  
II. REGULATORY MODELS IN TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXTS 
The administrative environment in which the parties operate is an important 
consideration when examining P3 contracts. It stands to reason that weak 
regulatory regimes would prefer to rely upon highly-negotiated contract terms (or 
renegotiation) to ensure the private party is held liable for risk or harm to the host 
country’s interests. Unfortunately, such contracts are expensive to negotiate and 
invariably fail to address at least some material concerns.73 On the other hand, 
strongly enforced regulations effectively incorporate a wide range of statutory and 
administrative laws into the contract, necessitating significant expenditures in the 
form of oversight and enforcement.74 BP’s disregard of public regulations without 
consequence indicates poor enforcement,75 whereas the necessity of ex post 
renegotiation indicates lack of adequate bargaining during the negotiation phase.76 
In looking to improve the balance between contract and administrative law, the 
nature of regulation itself is in question: what should it look like? Professor Aman 
identifies three models of administrative regulation: market-based regulation, 
strong regulatory state, and efficient-state regulation.77  
A. The Ideological Methods: Market-Based and Strong Regulatory State Models 
In many ways, these two models mimic “traditional political debates between 
conservatives and liberals, at least regarding issues within U.S. borders.”78 Each 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. Id. at 3 (“[P3s] might . . . impose costs on taxpayers that may not always be 
evident.”).  
 71. See LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 31–42 (discussing the historical development of P3s 
and their present necessity). 
 72. See LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 176 (“The apparent motivation behind 
the approach [of creating P3s] has shifted to some degree from an attempt to move 
infrastructure spending and debt off the government books . . . .”). 
 73. See OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 122. 
 74. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 97–98. 
 75. See Clayton, supra note 46.  
 76. See OMOROGBE, supra note 60, at 5–6. 
 77. See generally AMAN, supra note 50, at 118–24. 
 78. Id. at 119. 
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model is a relic of an earlier paradigm and not particularly well suited to the global 
marketplace.79  
 Market-based regulation treats contracts as the superior form of governance and 
propounds two goals: maximum autonomy for the contracting parties and minimal 
government intervention or oversight.80 While reducing the burden of regulation is 
a legitimate aim of both private and public parties,81 the danger of market-based 
regulation is that it is inherently incapable of recognizing a public interest beyond 
what the market itself may provide.82 In a market-based regulatory scheme 
involving transnational P3s, the government delegates its public-welfare duty and 
provides the foreign entity incentive to skirt regulations inasmuch as the 
cost-benefit balance compels it to do so.83 The danger of allowing transnational, 
private corporations organized outside the United States to determine the degree to 
which they should uphold the government’s aims should be self-evident. 
Market-based regulation is not without merit in some instances; public bodies may 
sanction non-self-enforcing private regulations for the sake of convenience and 
efficiency.84 But even in smaller industries where some degree of private 
self-policing has proven effective, public regulation is almost always a necessary 
backstop to voluntary self-regulation.85 As a practical matter, it is very difficult to 
imagine a set of effective, voluntary measures BP would have been more likely to 
follow than the public regulations it ignored at the peril of its workers and the 
environment.86 As noted in the context of the 2008 financial collapse, “voluntary 
regulation does not work.”87  
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. See id. at 117 (noting that both methods “clearly resonate with long-standing 
political assumptions and public-law theories”).  
 80. See id. at 120; see also Karin Svedberg Helgesson, Partnerships, Boundary 
Blurring, and Accountable Actorhood, in DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 45, at 24, 24 (noting that under a market regulation 
scheme, “the business sector is expected to help produce frameworks for governing itself by 
creating industry standards, codes of conduct, and other rules as a complement to, or even 
substitute for, intra- and interstate regulation”).  
 81. See supra text accompanying note 36. The purpose of P3s is to reduce costs and 
create profits. Costs imposed by government regulation necessarily hamper both. 
 82. Peters and Pierre pithily note that market-based regulation creates a “private-private 
partnership.” Peters & Pierre, supra note 54, at 42–43. 
 83. AMAN, supra note 50, at 119. 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 81.  
 85. See Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking, in ARCHON FUNG, DARA O’ROURKE & 
CHARLES SABEL, CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS? 54 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers 
eds., 2001) (critiquing the optimism of an article which claims viable private or 
self-regulating measures are possible absent government enforcement).  
 86. See, e.g., Dina Cappiello, Another Report Says BP Ignored Warning Signs on 
Doomed Deepwater Horizon Well, AL.COM (Nov. 17, 2010, 9:59 AM), 
http://blog.al.com/wire/2010/11/report_bp_ignored_warnings.html (noting that in the months 
leading up to the disaster, BP recklessly disregarded a multitude of regulations, norms, and 
warnings).  
 87. STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY 
DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 159 (2009) (citing former SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox remarking upon the failure of market-based, voluntary regulation in 
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Expansive bureaucracies regulating even privatized and global industries typify 
the strong regulatory state model.88 As evidenced by circumstances surrounding the 
BP spill, an expansive regulatory regime may result in costly, redundant oversight 
functions and an overgrown bureaucracy that compromises the effectiveness of the 
administrative system as a whole.89 As studies and reports concerning the BP 
disaster have surfaced, the degree to which regulations were in place but 
unenforced has become clear.90 The inspector general’s office found that MMS 
regulators were “heavily reliant on industry to document and accurately report on 
operations, production, and royalties.”91 The administrative bureaucracy overseeing 
BP metastasized to the point that even the various agencies tasked with oversight 
were not sure of their responsibilities.92 While overseeing BP’s operations, MMS 
regulators failed to review data submissions by the operators regarding deepwater 
drilling,93 seek sufficient information prior to approving drill permit applications,94 
specify well design and materials requirements,95 require tests for the prevention 
system implicated in the disaster,96 or notice obvious clerical and mathematical 
errors on BP documents.97 In addition, the investigating commission found that 
MMS regulators had violated ethical rules and disregarded safety guidelines.98 As 
the facts surrounding the Spill indicate, having numerous agencies tasked with 
oversight does not ensure effective oversight,99 especially where overlap creates 
confusion regarding each agency’s responsibilities.100 
Balancing operational efficiency for private parties and effective regulation by 
public parties demands rethinking existing administrative structures. A cornerstone 
of such a reform is eliminating incentives that tend to result in captured regulators 
and opaque governance agencies in which ineffectual oversight is hidden from 
public view until disaster strikes.101 The “major implication of this broader 
                                                                                                                 
preventing the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers).  
 88. AMAN, supra note 50, at 120 (“To strong regulatory state advocates, the public 
sphere, particularly when it comes to the economic and environmental well-being of 
individuals should be a broad one . . . .”).  
 89. See, e.g., Deepwater Horizon Spill Report Blames BP, Contractors, Government, 
ENVTL. NEWS SERV. (Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Deepwater], http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/nov2010/2010-11-17-01.html (describing confusion among agencies 
tasked with regulating the oil drilling industry). 
 90. See, e.g., id. 
 91. Clayton, supra note 46 (quoting Mary Kendall, Acting Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of Interior).  
 92. See Laura Strickler, BP Rig Missed 16 Inspections Before Explosion, CBS NEWS 
(June 11, 2010, 5:39 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_162-20007514-
10391695.html.  
 93. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, CHIEF COUNSEL’S REPORT 253 (2011). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 254. 
 96. Id. at 256 (noting “the lack of any regulation requiring negative pressure tests”).  
 97. Id. at 259. 
 98. Id. at 261. 
 99. See Eilperin, supra note 17.  
 100. See Strickler, supra note 92.  
 101. See, e.g., Peters & Pierre, supra note 54, at 46–47 (discussing the detrimental effects 
1326 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1315 
 
reconfiguration seems to lie in a renegotiation of what is or should be governed by 
market competition, what is or should be governed by democratic procedures, and 
how these two mechanisms (should) interrelate.”102  
B. The Pragmatic Method: The Efficient-State Regulation Model 
Reforming the regulatory system challenges lawmakers to find “a balance 
between the use of official standards bodies and market forces to set standards.”103 
The efficient-state regulatory model borrows from principles of modern corporate 
governance’s emphasis on streamlining and internal cooperation,104 as well as the 
focus on public welfare interests and effective oversight that are hallmarks of 
strong regulatory states.105 As the name suggests, the model emphasizes efficient, 
as opposed to expansive, regulation.106 The strengths of this model are its task 
rather than process orientation, and its fluidity rather than parochialism.107 The 
primary drawbacks of this model are the potential for increased front-end costs, as 
well as structural and procedural obstacles to implementing such a system.108  
The efficient-state regulatory model emphasizes transparency, accountability, 
and efficiency. Effectively implementing an efficient-state model encourages input 
from a broad range of interests in order to best assign the numerous responsibilities 
inherent in complex transactions.109 Under an efficient-state model, BP and the 
MMS would negotiate a lease with input from subcontractors, independent 
scientists and engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, labor unions, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and foreseeably affected industries such 
as fisheries, coastal businesses, and oil refineries, among others. By including a 
greater cross-section of interested parties, the front-end negotiations will greatly 
improve the assignment of responsibilities and liabilities, ultimately reducing the 
need for back-end regulatory measures and contract litigation or renegotiation.  
An expanded roster of contract participants further increases transparency.110 In 
practice if not by design, the current regulatory model keeps citizens uninformed111 
and is largely unable to prevent self-interested technocrats and managers, whose 
                                                                                                                 
to public welfare interests engendered by opaque governance structures); see also LIKOSKY, 
supra note 33, at 25 (“What is worrisome is when mixing is obscured from public view.”).  
 102. Dingwerth & Hanreider, supra note 45, at 97.  
 103. Peter Grindley, Regulation and Standards Policy: Setting Standards by Committees 
and Markets, in THE REGULATORY CHALLENGE 210 (Matthew Bishop, John Kay & Colin 
Mayer eds., 1995).  
 104. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 121–22. 
 105. See id. at 120 (“To strong regulatory state advocates, the public sphere, particularly 
when it comes to the economic and environmental well-being of individuals should be a 
broad one . . . .”).  
 106. See id.at 121. 
 107. See id.  
 108. See infra Part IV.B.  
 109. See id.at 141–44 (stating that the inclusion of non-participants is the best way to 
ensure representation of public welfare interests, as well as to sufficiently develop and assign 
contract liabilities during the negotiation process).  
 110. See id. at 143–44.  
 111. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 141 (“Openness, accountability, and citizen 
participation are vital to new governance regimes now emerging.”). 
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interests are often aligned against transparency, from dictating the deal’s terms in 
derogation of the public welfare interests or third parties’ economic concerns.112 
The present regulatory model often operates to reduce or eliminate the influence of 
public-interest actors even though public money is being spent to oversee the 
projects.113 Within P3s, opaqueness tends to benefit the private parties, who 
negotiate self-interestedly before complaints can be registered, depend on the 
rational apathy or ignorance of the public, and “firefight” the problem with the 
most cost-effective measures if necessary.114 This paradigm is reflected the 
circumstances leading up to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.115 The lifting of the 
moratorium on deepwater drilling not long before the Spill, over strenuous protests 
by NGOs, raises a suspicion that the government failed to adequately weigh the 
public interests at stake.116 Governance of P3s with the potential to cause so much 
damage to the public should necessitate greater participation by public-interest 
advocates.117 Given the high financial stakes at play in large transnational P3s,118 
economic rather than public welfare consideration may be overemphasized in 
negotiating and regulating P3 arrangements.119 However, the Act demonstrates 
public welfare costs are both monetizable and substantial,120 and should therefore 
not be ignored.  
Aside from implicating democratic ideals,121 the government’s failure to 
represent the public interest overlooks potentially serious consequences, as 
evidenced by the lives lost aboard the Deepwater Horizon and the negative 
commercial impact of the Spill.122 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 176 (“P3 planners typically oppose efforts at 
deliberative participatory decision-making.”); see also id. at 182 (noting that citizens are not 
partners, their interests are a cost to be mitigated). 
 113. See id.; see also AMAN, supra note 50, at 144 (noting that once the bargaining enters 
the administrative agency phase, bargaining with NGOs and public interest groups is 
limited).  
 114. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 180–83. 
 115. See Deepwater, supra note 89.  
 116. See Shannon, supra note 41 (discussing how energy policy concerns led to the 
decision to lift the deepwater drilling ban, over protests from NGOs); see also Eilperin, 
supra note 17 (noting that the government granted BP a categorical exclusion from 
submitting an environmental impact analysis only eleven days prior to explosion).  
 117. See Peters & Pierre, supra note 54, at 52 (“[G]overnance of [P3s] has to be 
embedded in public values and must serve under sufficient political control to meet minimal 
requirements of transparency.”). 
 118. See Hahn, supra note 42 (noting the United States collected $6.5 billion in royalties 
from extraction leases in 2009).  
 119. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 144 (“[E]conomic discourse . . . increasingly dominates 
regulation . . . .”).  
 120. In this instance, the costs to BP may exceed eight to sixteen times the total amount 
of extraction lease royalties the United States received in 2009. See supra text accompanying 
notes 60–63. 
 121. See STEETS, supra note 44, at 48 (“[W]herever power is exercised there should be 
mechanisms of accountability . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 4 and 61–63.  
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While transparency primarily involves the public side of a P3, accountability 
should be of primary concern to both sides123—public negotiators depend upon 
reelection for their positions of power and the private negotiators have come to 
recognize the necessity of positive public relations.124 As noted generally in 
transnational contexts, “accountability is largely driven by public interest 
groups,”125 and in the absence of accountability mechanisms, P3s are prone to 
abuse or corruption.126 A poignant example of moral hazard in an environment of 
minimal accountability is the MMS’s exemption of BP from an environmental 
impact study over NGO objections and based only on BP’s self-serving report to 
the MMS.127  
Effective accountability mechanisms require clear internal rules and predictable 
oversight.128 Participation by a wider range of parties should increase 
accountability and benefit all parties through better-defined responsibilities and 
oversight roles. Clear standards and rules reduce the likelihood of costly litigation 
and enforcement proceedings; predictability and stability entice other private 
parties to form P3s with the host country; and predictability should operate to 
reduce insurance costs as risks are better defined.129 The Act seeks to impose an 
unpredictable standard of liability. The moratorium paralyzes business to the 
detriment of both P3 parties and the consumers. The Spill cost BP billions of 
dollars, and litigation will only increase the expenses. The costs to the United 
States are undetermined. The quantifiable costs from unpredictable accountability 
standards are massive and likely still growing.130 More effective accountability 
mechanisms may well have prevented an extremely costly accident in this 
instance,131 and could prevent future disasters.  
Efficiency likewise concerns both business and government entities, to the 
extent it often predominates transparency and accountability concerns.132 BP’s 
costs from the Spill are in the tens of billions of dollars; the cost of enhanced 
oversight and negotiation could hardly reach this level. A public law system that is 
both effective and efficient benefits P3s and justifies the market-based regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 25 (“As a matter of policy, if a government promotes 
certain corporate groups, then the government should be accountable for the actions of such 
groups.”).  
 124. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS 
ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 94 (1972) (noting that businesses’ acceptance of 
corporate social responsibility norms are so entrenched as to be beyond debate). 
 125. LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 176. 
 126. Id. at 163. 
 127. See Eilperin, supra note 17.  
 128. See STEETS, supra note 44, at 105–06.  
 129. This benefit is most applicable to smaller transnationals as BP’s subsidiary 
underwriter, Jupiter Insurance, Ltd., will not underwrite liability in excess of $700 million, 
well below BP’s estimated liability in this instance. See Cessna, supra note 59. 
 130. See supra note 120.  
 131. See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 93, at 225–61 (detailing the many ways in which the Spill 
might have been prevented and implicating a lack of accountability as a primary cause of the 
accident).  
 132. See supra note 119.  
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measures adopted by some agencies.133 Devising a fluid system subject to 
government control is the best means of ensuring efficient and effective 
regulation.134 However, third-party participation at the planning stages and high 
standards of accountability should be part of the system for it to remain effective in 
the long term.135 Effective, as opposed to expansive, oversight is necessarily better 
equipped to avoid financial and environmental disasters and associated government 
costs than are voluntary measures or labyrinthine regulatory structures. The 
challenge is in adopting structural changes that encourage efficient oversight and 
safeguard against inefficiencies and entrenched special interests in the regulatory 
process.  
In light of the incentives and realities of global business and public welfare, an 
efficient-state system is the most realistic means of increasing accountability and 
transparency in P3s while maintaining efficiency. The three goals of efficient-state 
model are interrelated. Increased accountability encourages transparency and 
reduces the costs associated with uncertainty and instability. Increased transparency 
creates opportunities to bargain for public welfare136 and thereby reduce oversight 
costs through greater contractual participation and accountability assignment. 
III. THE EFFICIENT-STATE SOLUTION  
In negotiating a P3 arrangement, the government assumes both public welfare 
aims and private contract party responsibilities.137 Risk taking is implicit in P3 
arrangements generally, and extraction industry arrangements in particular, so a 
significant function of the negotiation phase is to equitably assign risk among the 
parties while protecting each party’s broader interests.138 The private side seeks to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 141–43 (noting methods the Administrative Procedure 
Act uses to set standards rather than rules). 
 134. See Peters & Pierre, supra note 54, at 52–53 (“For such [transnational] partnerships 
to become useful instruments, they have to cater to public and collective objectives. This 
requires some degree of external control . . . .”).  
 135. See, e.g., Cappiello, supra note 86 (noting that in the months leading up to the 
disaster, BP recklessly disregarded a multitude of regulations, norms, and warnings).  
 136. See STEETS, supra note 44, at 48 (“‘[A]dequate governance mechanisms [...] must be 
more inclusive and participatory—that is, more democratic—than in the past.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting COMM’N ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD: THE 
REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (1995))); see also id. at 47–48 (discussing 
the democracy deficit in transnational P3s).  
 137. See LIKOSKY, supra note 33, at 23–24.  
 138. The efficacy of risk transfer is debated, however. Compare LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, 
supra note 33, at 176 (“The empirical case for cost reduction and risk transfer, however, has 
not been established, and some suggest that ‘In infrastructure projects, it rarely makes sense 
to try to transfer large amounts of risk to the private sector.’” (citation omitted)), with 
STEETS, supra note 44, at 40 (“Trust reduces transaction costs and thereby enables 
institutions to work more efficiently.” (footnote omitted)). If risk transfer is indeed an 
exercise in futility, it makes the public welfare negotiation even more important as the 
financial risks cannot be sufficiently assigned or even estimated. See LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, 
supra note 33, at 175 (“Transaction costs of the P3 route are often not accurately or fully 
recorded.”).  
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reduce the risk it absorbs and insure against the risk it undertakes; the public side 
seeks to minimize its risk exposure and inure benefits to its constituency.139 As with 
all negotiations, a fundamental concern is reducing the overall transaction costs 
relative to the benefits inuring under the contract. Assigning risk and evaluating 
transaction costs within the P3 context implicate the same concerns as the 
efficient-state model: how to best assign risk in light of transparency, 
accountability, efficiency, and public welfare concerns. 
A. Transparency, Accountability, Public Welfare, and Efficiency  
Bäckstrand notes that bringing third parties to the table encourages greater 
consideration of risks inherent in nonpublic arrangements,140 overcoming the 
perception that “[d]eliberative processes [in P3s] tend to be cosmetic and symbolic, 
and are often added on or serve to legitimize decisions already made.”141 
Transparency in the negotiation process assures greater representation of interests 
than will occur in closed negotiations between the government and special 
interests, or “peak organizations.”142 Narrowing the interests represented in the 
negotiation phase is more apt to produce a final contract in which the parties regard 
public welfare interests as externalities.143 Conversely, a contract that assigns the 
widest possible range of duties and responsibilities should reduce the overall cost 
of administration and enforcement.144  
The government’s responsibility to safeguard the public welfare should inform 
the negotiation process.145 If the government does not adequately bargain for public 
welfare, the contract terms will not likely ensure such aims are met, especially 
given the practical and procedural problems of indemnified or inadequately insured 
transnational subcontractors.146 Furthermore, where the government fails to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. See LOXLEY WITH LOXLEY, supra note 33, at 176 (“The apparent motivation behind 
the approach [of creating P3s] has shifted to some degree from an attempt to move 
infrastructure spending and debt off the government books, to a desire to reduce costs 
through transferring risk to the private sector.”). 
 140. See, e.g., Karin Bäckstrand, From Rhetoric to Practice: The Legitimacy of Global 
Public-Private Partnerships for Sustainable Development, in DEMOCRACY AND 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 45, at 145 (examining 
the effects of greater stakeholder participation on transparency and accountability in the 
CDM and Johannesburg partnerships).  
 141. Id. at 159.  
 142. AMAN, supra note 50, at 143. 
 143. See, e.g., LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 170 (“[O]ur domestic economy sees aspects of 
the public interest as risks to be mitigated. By reformulating public interest concerns as risks 
to project profitability, financial institutions in effect domesticate the common good.”). 
 144. See id. at 191.  
 145. See, e.g., AMAN, supra note 50, at 143 (“[T]he state . . . seeks to assert its view of 
the public interest in the course of bargaining.”). 
 146. See David Phillips, It Lost an Oil Rig, but Transocean May Easily Ride Out the Gulf 
Oil Spill, BNET (May 13, 2010), http://www.bnet.com/blog/sec-filings/it-lost-an-oil-rig-but-
transocean-may-easily-ride-out-the-gulf-oil-spill/360?tag=content (describing Transocean’s 
insurance and indemnification against losses); see also Kahn, supra note 10 (describing the 
difficulty BP had in recovering from its subcontractors).  
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negotiate public welfare aims, it creates a moral hazard in the private entity; BP 
received little warning that its numerous violations would impel government 
sanctions.147 Reducing the private party’s moral hazard at the negotiation stage is a 
government’s public welfare responsibility.148  
Government should adopt a more risk-averse posture in negotiation and a more 
aggressive compliance-enforcement posture. Risk aversion by the government will 
incentivize greater negotiation by both parties to efficiently spread costs to insurers 
and seek input from NGOs and other interested parties to better understand those 
costs. On the downside, including a wider range of participants could raise costs of 
bidding, planning, and negotiating,149 although there is at least some debate as to 
whether these costs are permanent.150 From a short-term transaction cost 
perspective, the administrative issues of bringing more parties to the table are a 
disincentive, as is the willingness of P3s to undertake additional public 
responsibilities as part of the contract.151 Requiring BP to negotiate on a wider 
range of issues and with more parties would give contract signatories enforcement 
power through the agreement’s terms, while creating strong incentives for BP to 
insure against its losses at the outset. Though BP could always disregard 
regulations at its own peril, expanding the roster of participants in the negotiation 
and embedding them in the oversight mechanism would enable policing by 
interested parties and thus reduce enforcement costs.  
B. Renegotiation and Its Costs 
After a disaster like the Spill, the government is likely to impose harsh measures 
such as an industry-chilling moratorium on drilling152 or renegotiation as in the 
form of the Act.153 The effects of the moratorium and renegotiation on business, 
policy, and consumer interests are likely to have far-reaching indirect effects, 
destabilizing investment and increasing regulation costs.154  
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. See Strickler, supra note 92 (noting BP’s repeated failure to meet inspection 
requirements without significant adverse consequences).  
 148. MCAFEE & MCMILLAN, supra note 36, at 17 (“Moral hazard, like risk aversion, is an 
element that the government agency must consider in designing the optimal contract.”); see 
also Boddewyn, supra note 39, at 196 (“Ongoing operations, on the other hand, require a 
type of government relations focusing on the integration of the guest company in to the host 
economy and society through the obeying of laws . . . .”).  
 149. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 170 (“[P]articipatory planning is reformulated as a 
financial risk to the interest of planners, a risk that must be mitigated at the least possible 
cost to the project’s commercial interests.”).  
 150. See STEETS, supra note 44, at 40 (“Trust reduces transaction costs and thereby 
enables institutions to work more efficiently.” (footnote omitted)). 
 151. See LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 170.  
 152. A seven-year moratorium was imposed on deepwater drilling, which is almost 
certain to stifle oil exploration and American energy policy for its duration. See John M. 
Broder & Clifford Krauss, U.S. Drops Bid to Explore Oil in Eastern Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
2, 2010, at A1. 
 153. See supra text accompanying note 68.  
 154. See Brooks, supra note 38 (discussing the likely harmful effects to the oil industry in 
light of government actions taken in response to the Gulf Oil Spill).  
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Renegotiation portends many hidden costs that ultimately harm the public as 
well as the private industries.155 Renegotiation is likely to impose oppressive terms 
on the private partner as the public side renegotiates only when it recognizes a 
deficiency in its perceived benefits under the contract.156 In the present instance, 
U.S. taxpayers have funded the cleanup and seek to recover from BP. As 
undesirable as the outcome that taxpayers foot the bill for BP’s negligence is, the 
prospective costs to taxpayers of renegotiation are likewise substantial, if indirect. 
There is a fierce competition for transnational partnerships in the extraction sector, 
and private parties will disfavor contracting with a country that negotiates for 
oppressive terms, leaving the host country’s core industries underdeveloped.157  
Renegotiation’s unpredictable nature increases the political risk of the country 
that utilizes it. The more political risk—or likelihood of acting unpredictably 
against the private party’s interests—a country holds, the less likely transnational 
actors will invest in that country, depriving the country of revenue, infrastructure, 
and access to cheaper resources.158 Transnational industries will look closely at 
BP’s liability for the Spill, especially costs imposed by the Act. If the United States 
punishes BP harshly, future partners in P3s will seek greater assurances in the 
negotiation process in order to do business within the United States. Accordingly, 
the United States could be forced to make more front-end concessions to remain a 
competitive foreign investment destination, further eroding its bargaining position 
vis-à-vis public welfare interests.159 Increasing the risk or cost of doing business in 
the United States may dissuade transnational extraction companies from 
contracting with United States altogether. Fewer P3s with transnationals will result 
in more of those contracts going to domestic industries, which will likely increase 
costs to the public side through greater overhead, insurance, and tax subsidy 
costs.160 The ancillary effects of fewer transnational P3s will likely include higher 
insurance costs, less market participation from smaller firms, and reduced overall 
foreign investment in American infrastructure.161 In order to avoid negative 
perceptions stemming from the Act, the United States would be well served to 
decrease regulatory compliance costs and enhance P3 stability through an 
efficient-state regulatory model. The rationale behind transnational P3s is to reduce 
the host country’s development costs, but inadequate negotiation, poor regulation, 
or renegotiation could inadvertently increase both the economic and external costs 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. See id.  
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of such arrangements past the point at which it is rational to form such 
relationships.162  
Inasmuch as the proposed Act is a renegotiation of BP’s liability at the lease’s 
inception, and insofar as the effects of such a renegotiation are harmful to the oil 
industry, consumers, and American taxpayers, the U.S. government should avoid 
similar measures in the future. As a complement to efficient-state regulatory 
measures, an effective way to avoid such costly measures is an enhanced contract 
negotiation process that brings the responsibilities of the parties closer to 
self-enforcing than they are under the existing regulatory model. Enhanced 
accountability, transparency, and consideration of the public welfare ultimately 
increase efficiency and serve to preclude measures such as the Act and the 
moratorium, both of which are toxic to transnational investment in, and 
development of, the United States’ vital industries.  
IV. THE FUTURE OF REGULATION AND CONTRACT IN TRANSNATIONAL P3 
CONTEXTS 
The Act raises important questions regarding effective regulation and public 
welfare. Retroactive measures, such as the Act and its predecessor the OPA, are 
necessary and meaningful only in the wake of disasters, but such measures cannot 
retroactively prevent or rectify disasters.163 BP can pay costs even in excess of $50 
billion.164 However, smaller oil drilling companies are not so profitable and future 
measures may not be possible with a less wealthy P3 partner.165 Recognizing that 
some disasters will always be inevitable, liability may still be more cheaply and 
effectively negotiated for ex ante by improving the contract bargaining process and 
streamlining the administrative role—hallmarks of an efficient-state theory. Despite 
the benefits of enhanced accountability, public welfare protection, transparency, 
and efficiency, realizing an efficient-state regulatory system will not be possible 
without overcoming entrenched perceptions and structural impediments to reform.  
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A. Perception Obstacles 
The Act raises questions about how to create more effective regulatory 
processes so that measures like the Act are not required again.166 The U.S. 
government’s fumbled response to the Spill is an indictment of the present 
regulatory model’s limitations.167 Reforming the regulatory paradigm and moving 
from the inertia of the present regulatory system to that of an efficient-state system 
requires more than mere persuasion; it requires the will to transform perceptions of 
American regulation, not only domestically but also abroad.  
1. Transnational Perceptions 
The Act increases political risk by raising the possibility that retrospective 
increases in liability limits will become the paradigm of future regulation.168 The 
United States is presently a prime destination for P3s in large part for its perceived 
willingness to underwrite risk to the benefit of the private parties.169 The Act’s loss 
reassignment to BP may be politically defensible, but such ex post measures are 
capricious considering the government is not without blame for the disaster.170 The 
United States’s increase in BP’s liability limits cannot inspire confidence in other 
transnationals bidding for extraction leases.  
In crafting better-defined public welfare responsibilities within P3s, front-end 
participation of public interests and NGOs is desirable, not a cost to be avoided.171 
The irony of risk allocation in transnational P3s is that most of the transnationals 
active in extraction industries are from well-developed countries that have public 
welfare aims strongly entrenched in their native business climate.172 In its 
hidebound insistence on mitigating nonmarket costs173 the U.S. government 
overlooks the possibility that foreign operators are not so hostile to costs associated 
with safeguarding the public welfare. It is not unthinkable that the U.S. government 
could bargain for greater public benefits in P3s without completely overwhelming 
the incentives presently inherent in the U.S. business climate. Rather than 
renegotiate ex post, the United States is in a prime position to bargain ex ante with 
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2012] REGULATION, RENEGOTIATION, AND REFORM 1335 
 
transnationals to more effectively assign liability while better protecting American 
public policy concerns.  
2. Domestic Perceptions 
Domestic perceptions of regulatory reform will depend largely on the scope of 
reform adopted. On the unlikely end of the scale is the American government 
opting to turn P3s into publicly held corporations as in the European model, rather 
than creating extraction leases subject to administrative oversight as it presently 
does.174 Adopting the European model would make the P3 a government operation, 
ostensibly creating avenues for greater transparency and concomitantly reducing 
the need for secrecy.175 Furthermore, the government could appoint watchdog 
directors from outside industries such as NGOs and labor unions to reduce its 
administrative costs. A likely insurmountable obstacle to such reform is 
legitimizing such a socialized structure in the American business environment.176  
The most likely result will be business as usual, with both sides hoping disaster 
will not befall them and relying on renegotiation and litigation if it does. But the 
tremendous public welfare and financial costs associated with this paradigm make 
it undesirable. The most formidable obstacle to implementing efficient-state 
regulatory measures is not a cost assessment, but the political reality of the present 
system: most politicians in a competitively democratic system crave the chance to 
make headlines, not to work behind the scenes. A well-publicized act by Congress 
may garner more votes than a quiet, effective one that averts disasters like the Spill. 
Furthermore, efficient measures offer fewer justifications for taxes and spending, 
while any reduction in the bureaucratic state means entrenched interests must first 
be defeated.  
The predominant approach for a government aided by the possibility of 
renegotiation is to approach initial negotiations as a win-win situation.177 As the 
Act demonstrates, the U.S. government may anticipate gaining from the contract as 
written or rely upon a later renegotiation to the detriment of investors, third parties, 
and its P3 partners. Since the government is capable of controlling the 
administrative information disseminated to the public and could thus refuse to 
disclose facts surrounding its negotiations, few incentives are in place to encourage 
the government to approach P3 negotiations with the care a truly private party 
would.178  
To sustain P3 arrangements and the public welfare interests of its citizens, the 
U.S. government must shift its fundamental assumptions in negotiating P3s. Rather 
than engage in its own form of firefighting, or ad hoc damage control, the 
government should bargain as a private party unable to rely upon unilateral 
renegotiation as a viable alternative to due diligence. Though this simple shift in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. See AMAN, supra note 50, at 87–88 (comparing the U.S. and European P3 models).  
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negotiation tactics would result in an immediate return, it is difficult to predict if it 
would be sufficient in itself, and even its implementation would require 
overcoming the structural tendency toward a neocorporatist179 negotiation 
process.180  
B. Structural Issues 
A common shortcoming of P3 leases is their failure to anticipate conflict 
resolution, the need for adaptation, or the true costs of renegotiation.181 Such 
failures are contract issues that could be avoided through better agreement 
structuring. Though many details of BP’s lease are unavailable to the public, 
apparently neither the BP lease nor the statutory limitations on liability sufficiently 
anticipated the scope of the Spill’s damage or the legal and financial costs of 
recovery.182 Omorogbe notes that “[w]hat a fluctuating investment climate needs is 
not contract revision whenever fundamental changes occur. Instead . . . the 
fluctuating nature of the investment climate should be taken into account.”183  
Omorogbe also suggests that “the right agreement for any HC [host country] is 
first and foremost one that is capable of managing and supervising efficiently.”184 
Incentives to cut costs through reduced safety expenditures and compliance are 
likely highest where costs, risks, and uncertainty are highest—fixed-price contracts 
for exploratory drilling. For example, the BP lease was in the form of a fixed-price 
contract, more specifically, a royalty-bearing license.185 In fixed-price leases, 
profits accruing to the private partner vary inversely with development costs.186 
Since every additional dollar spent by BP on compliance, safety, or research is 
subtracted from its bottom line, this form of contract strongly encourages cost 
cutting. A typical production-sharing agreement187 likewise incents the explorer to 
cut all possible costs in bringing oil to the surface.188 Participation agreements and 
joint ventures can be desirable alternatives to concessionary contracts as they are 
highly negotiated at each stage, rely largely on self-enforcing regulations, and 
allow the host country greater control over the extraction process.189 The United 
States should consider various forms of leases designed to ensure, in each case, that 
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oversight “objectives are satisfied, adequate financial benefits are accruing to the 
state, and the company is assured of an acceptable level of profits at all times.”190  
Limited market-based regulation is also desirable provided the government 
structurally implements sufficient oversight ex ante. Private, or market-based, 
regulations require less input, draw from a narrow range of generally aligned 
interests, can respond quickly to change, and encourage the private party to 
participate in creating mutually beneficial standards for compliance.191 Because of 
these advantages, both governments and private parties are likely to find such 
private or nonlegal regulations more workable in complex projects involving 
transnational actors, multiple subcontractors, a host of regulations from overlapping 
industries, and a nexus of publicly traded companies whose stock prices are in 
permanent flux.192 Purely public laws are potentially obstructive in such complex 
arrangements, where participants attempt to minimize the effect of complicated 
regulatory mechanisms while maximizing profits.193 The key to effective 
market-based regulations is that they should not be a last resort in lieu of regulation 
or intended to circumvent oversight; the parties should agree upon clear standards 
and judiciously assign responsibility.194 For example, fixing contract terms through 
extensive negotiation, aligning incentives through a joint-venture agreement for 
extraction, assigning third-party interests to assist in enforcement, and tying 
economic incentives to compliance can all be used in conjunction with 
market-based regulations. Similar provisions in transnational P3 contracts will cost 
less to implement and maintain than the status quo, while better safeguarding 
American public welfare interests.  
Integrating the benefits of private and public regulatory schemes is the principle 
underlying the call for enhanced contract negotiation procedures and efficient-state 
regulatory processes. To achieve these ends, public lawmakers can draw lessons 
from the theories that gave rise to private regulations in the first instance: corporate 
legal models, transnational legal pluralism, and notions of the government as a 
fiduciary. In recognition of common underlying aims in calls for efficient-state 
regulation, aspects from these models may enhance the operation of P3s and 
preserve the public and private benefits contemplated by those arrangements.  
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1. Corporate Legal Models and Transnational Legal Pluralism  
In response to globalization and the need for businesses to operate across many 
jurisdictions simultaneously, many private actors and the entities that regulate them 
have rethought the necessity of centralized control and the nature of regulation.195 
Corporate models involve less parochialism, tend to be task oriented rather than 
process oriented, and emphasize cooperation and efficiency.196 Such models are 
especially beneficial in transnational contexts, where labyrinthine layers of 
regulation may create only an illusion of process while inhibiting effectual 
oversight.197 The desirability of voluntary, or private, regulations has arisen from 
public law’s inability to keep pace with the necessities of commerce, as well as the 
absence of a universal enforcement framework—indeed, the unworkability of such 
a framework.198 The scholarship of transnational legal pluralism deals extensively 
with transparency and accountability in transnational industries, as well as means 
of realizing these goals.199 The primacy of these goals intends to bring business and 
privately regulated industries back under the umbrella of regulation by creating an 
avenue for a democratic citizenry, through its government, to supervise actions 
affecting national policy aims.200 The following suggestions for structural changes 
to P3 arrangements foster stability and efficiency—with the resultant 
profitability—that produced functional governance standards in the corporate and 
transnational contexts.201 
Where rights and duties are not defined in the contract or enforceable within 
juridical or administrative frameworks, private parties may compensate by 
developing unsanctioned, private regulations with attendant transparency and 
accountability issues,202 or by disregarding outright costly or inconvenient 
regulations.203 In either case, this neocorporatist process endangers the P3’s 
democratically sanctioned public welfare aims.204 The keys to successful corporate 
governance are its cooperative nature and horizontal integration, whereas the 
present regulatory system relies heavily on vertical integration.205 Corporate 
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governance networks, or horizontally integrated structures, have not entirely 
replaced vertical integration but, when adopted, have shifted the paradigm of 
regulation.206 Horizontal integration offers promising efficiency incentives to 
private parties in P3s: greater participatory planning in regulatory measures207 and 
less-restrictive oversight mechanisms through industry-wide, competitive 
self-policing measures.208  
Other useful measures derived from corporate legal models are tax and subsidy 
incentives tied to stringent compliance standards, thus enhancing efficiency while 
reducing costs and burdens to both public and private parties.209 By embedding 
watchdog overseers able to quickly approve or disapprove critical measures, or 
establishing ex ante unlimited liability for contractors who either fail to institute or 
conform to reasonable standards, the government could align BP’s interests with its 
own public welfare interests. As an added benefit, the noninvasive and efficient 
nature of the regulations will entice future extractors to comply with the 
regulations.  
In order to align public and private interests, public partners must create 
incentives that make compliance desirable and profitable to the private party, not 
simply an obstacle to business. In BP’s case, ignoring safety measures was 
preferable to regulatory compliance due to cost overruns that resulted from 
construction delays.210 Structuring the Macondo lease as a joint venture rather than 
a fixed-price contract could have included cost-sharing provisions for exploration 
in exchange for greater share of profits than were available under the fixed-price 
contract.211 This measure would have reduced BP’s incentive to cut exploration 
costs. The United States may also align public and private incentives by changing 
its assumptions when entering the negotiation process.212 Shorter contract periods 
will require more frequent assessments of the parties’ goals and demand a greater 
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degree of transparency. The BP lease was for five years,213 whereas a shorter term 
could allow for an easier adjustment of priorities and policies. More flexible 
contracts are also a means of reducing the cost and volatility of unscheduled 
renegotiation.214 By negotiating directly with smaller players rather than allowing 
the primary to engage them as subcontractors, the United States can enter into 
horizontally integrated agreements regulated by task-oriented entities created for 
the purpose. Another reform would be to contract on as comprehensive a range of 
issues as possible. The result of inadequate drafting makes litigation more likely, 
increasing costs and relegating questions of accountability to the postdisaster 
environment rather than the negotiation phase.215 The measures listed here intend to 
align incentives and ensure that regulation is both effective and noninvasive.  
The key to adopting corporate legal models in P3 arrangements is to promote 
cooperation and align the parties’ incentives to meet public welfare aims. Not all of 
the suggestions above should be applied in every case, but each is an option to be 
weighed in transnational P3s when economic stakes are high, moral hazard exists, 
and a potentially burdensome regulatory structure may incent bad behavior with 
disastrous consequences.  
2. Government as Fiduciary: Stronger Bargaining for Public Welfare  
In addition to its role as a private contractor seeking to maximize its economic 
benefit under the P3 arrangement,216 the government has a duty to bargain for the 
public welfare.217 The unwillingness of the United States government, under the 
present paradigm, to negotiate more strenuously with prospective transnational 
partners is a major concern.218 This Note advocates more proactive use of the 
government’s inherent powers to control operators within its jurisdictional reach. 
Government responsibility for public welfare entails aggressive bargaining not 
only for direct economic benefits, but also for indirect benefits such as labor, 
employment, natural resource protection, and infrastructure development, as well as 
other national interests that maximize economic development.219 Though the Act is 
an ex post acknowledgment of this duty, effective ex ante measures may include 
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delineating policy goals and devising structures to ensure these goals are 
voluntarily embraced by the private partner as well.220 Contracting horizontally 
with the subcontractors rather than vertically through primary contractors can 
ensure that all parties are aware of the public policy goals contemplated by the P3 
arrangement.221 Cross-subsidization of less-attractive aspects of the project may 
reduce the desirability of subcontracting to parties who are difficult to regulate or 
reach, and operate as another means to align private and public welfare interests by 
evenly distributing the wealth generated by the P3.222 Broader horizontal 
integration and contracting directly with parties rather than primaries that 
subcontract are means of keeping enforcement costs down and public/private 
interests aligned.223  
Enhanced ex ante negotiation is not immune from one major drawback of the 
Act: indirect costs to the public side from burdensome terms imposed upon the 
private party. The United States’ desirability as an investment location may 
diminish if private transnationals perceive third-party input at the negotiation stage 
as inimical to their interests.224 However, the United States is presently the home to 
the thirteenth-largest proven oil reserves in the world.225 Neither the Act nor the 
measures proposed in this Note will eradicate the geographic benefits of drilling in 
the United States. In light of this, a logical question is: why worry about 
renegotiation at all? The public party should seek to eschew the moral hazard and 
concomitant disregard for public welfare aims enabled by a renegotiation regime. 
Private parties also stand to gain when the public party’s incentives to renegotiate 
are minimized. A predictable regulatory system is ultimately more efficient and 
cheaper for private parties than the Russian-roulette style liability in place now, 
where the private party can flout rules until the resultant liability threatens the 
survival of the company itself.226 In addition, renegotiation exacerbates volatility, 
which acutely affects securities prices.227 When volatility results in part from the 
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security issuer’s own negligence, it may create further costs in the form of security 
holders’ litigation.228 A more effective regulatory scheme would greatly reduce the 
risk of volatility in large-capitalization extractors’ stock prices, protecting wealth 
and domestic investments.229 In a real sense, regulation can operate as a form of 
insurance for these companies, whereas renegotiation is a gamble that public 
industries, such as massive transnationals, would be better off avoiding.230  
For the time being, the United States enjoys significant geographical 
advantages, with profits realizable independent of modest cost increases in the 
negotiation process. Private and public parties tend to profit handsomely from 
successful P3s in the United States231 and can prospectively negotiate for a more 
balanced arrangement if costs are anticipated to increase as the result of structural 
changes. By bargaining for a wider range of public interests at the negotiation 
stage, the United States will reduce the likelihood of unpredictable, indirect 
economic and environmental costs associated with a regime that sanctions 
renegotiation as a viable alternative to inclusive, ex ante negotiation.  
The efficacy of the efficient-state model depends in part on willingness by the 
government to strenuously negotiate for public welfare interests,232 to take its 
difficult-to-monetize public welfare interests as seriously as its economic 
interests.233 The participation of subcontractors, NGOs, independent advisory 
experts, and representatives from local industries in the negotiation process could 
serve to effectively outsource the monetization studies to those industries, making a 
project’s cost-benefit analysis more reliable than one derived solely from either P3 
party. The present model is that of a state acting largely on behalf of entrenched 
economic and administrative interests to the detriment of broader public welfare 
interests.234 Overall, the implementation of even some of the ideas suggested in this 
Note will increase the efficiency of the process, reduce back-end costs for both 
public and private parties, and increase the likelihood that future negotiations will 
better represent a broader scope of public welfare aims while maximizing 
long-term profitability for both parties to transnational P3s.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. See Oil Spill Hits BP’s Stock, Threatens Its Future, supra note 13; see also Bates, 
supra note 63 (discussing costs of securities litigation stemming from material misstatements 
from BP).  
 229. See Wagner, supra note 227.  
 230. LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 288 (“[I]t is not always clear that shifts in the nature of 
partnerships [due to renegotiation] result in more equitable outcomes.”).  
 231. See Hahn, supra note 42 (noting that the United States received over $6.5 billion 
from exploratory leases in 2009); see also Graham, supra note 165 (noting that BP’s profits 
should be sufficient to pay clean-up costs).  
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 177–80. 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 117–20.  
 234. As noted by the executive director of an environmental group at the time of the 
Spill, “[MMS’s] oversight role has devolved to little more than rubber-stamping British 
Petroleum’s self-serving drilling plans.” Eilperin, supra note 17 (quoting Kierán Suckling, 
Executive Director, Center for Biological Diversity).  
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CONCLUSION 
The Gulf Oil Spill and its aftermath, including the moratorium and the Big Oil 
Bailout Prevention Unlimited Liability Acts, throw into relief the inadequacy of 
existing forms of regulation and P3 contract negotiation. Not merely reforming, but 
rethinking the American regulatory model is necessary to better ensure the 
representation of both public and private aims in transnational P3 arrangements. By 
embracing an efficient-state regulatory model, the administrative, litigation, and 
implementation costs of P3s can be greatly reduced, saving the public money. 
Unexpected costs to taxpayers can be more equitably absorbed by insurers and 
private parties when negotiated for ex ante. The model would also increase 
transparency, accountability, efficiency, and participation while giving public 
welfare actors more input into P3 negotiations.  
An enhanced bargaining process with representatives from the widest 
practicable range of affected third parties benefits the private parties of P3s in that 
it will better contemplate risk assignment and thereby reduce the likelihood of 
unilateral renegotiations, increase the likelihood that well-defined policy goals will 
be included in the contract, and create more-detailed information for the private 
parties’ insurer. Enhanced contract negotiations will reduce volatility in the P3 
arrangement and reduce the need for invasive regulation, thus stabilizing private 
parties’ expectations and increasing overall efficiency. Even if private parties are 
reluctant to adopt higher front-end costs that may arise from participation of a 
wider range of interests in the negotiation process, the government has tools to 
enhance cooperation: tax subsidies for compliance with safety standards; cost-
sharing agreements; delegation of market-based regulatory measures through 
horizontal integration of subcontractors, contractors, public interest groups, and 
oversight agencies; shorter contract periods; structuring the agreement based on 
responsibly assessed risk preferences; and the threat of higher insurance 
requirements, among a multitude of other possibilities.  
The Big Oil Bailout Prevention Unlimited Liability Act of 2011 represents much 
of what is wrong in the regulatory system in the United States. It is a 
backward-looking measure that does little to safeguard the public interest beyond 
mitigating financial losses235 arising from a preventable disaster.236 
Backward-looking measures like the Act are inevitable only where ex ante 
measures are insufficient to adequately safeguard both public and private aims. In 
order to avoid such ineffectual measures in the future, the U.S. government must 
adopt more efficient regulatory and negotiation processes. Winston Churchill once 
quipped that “democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others 
that have been tried . . . .”237 It could also be said today that renegotiation is the 
worst form of contract remedy except for all the others that have been tried. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 235. LIKOSKY, supra note 39, at 166 (“To make transparency backward-looking 
embraces a concept of forensic accountability that is not suited to progressive public interest 
minded planning.”).  
 236. See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 93, at 225–26. 
 237. JAMES C. HUMES, THE WIT & WISDOM OF WINSTON CHURCHILL 28 (Harper Perennial 
1995) (1994). 
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Efficient-state regulation will reduce administrative costs as compared to those of 
the present regulatory paradigm. Furthermore, the enhanced contract negotiation 
process fundamental to efficient-state regulation will better protect American 
public welfare interests and reduce costs for transnational parties by protecting 
against unpredictable policy shifts. Effective administration and efficient 
contracting will greatly reduce or eliminate the financial, environmental, public 
relations, business disruption, and compliance costs associated with measures like 
the moratorium and the Big Oil Bailout Prevention Unlimited Liability Act of 
2011. 
